

**GREATER BOMBAY : LOGIC, CLASS BASIS  
AND METHODOLOGY OF ITS GROWTH  
AND EXPANSION**

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Greater Bombay : Logic, Class Basis and  
Methodology of its Growth and Expansion\*

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The transformation of seven separate fishing islands in the Arabian Sea lying unconcerned with the events in its immediate neighbourhood of Konkan in about 200 B.C. to the present city of Greater Bombay encompassing in its ambit the whole of filled in city island, the adjoining salsette consisting of two different sub-urban zones (an inner one extending upto Andheri in the north-west and Mulund in the north-east and an outer one extending upto Dahisar and Thana in the same directions), an annexed industrial-residential Thana, and the spillover zone extending upto Titvala and Badsapur along the Central Railway and Pen along the Goa Highway has roughly taken 2200 years.<sup>1</sup> Diagnostic and prescriptive

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\* This piece draws its entire material from my larger study, "Land As a Resource For Planned Urban Development : A Case Study of New Bombay Experiment". An abridged project report with the title "Land As a Resource For Developing a New City : Rhetoric, Operationalisation and Lessons from New Bombay", written earlier, is appearing in a forthcoming issue of Nagar-lok. A detailed report, tentatively titled, "Fishing Islands to Metropolitan City : Logic, Class Basis and Methodology of Bombay's Growth and Expansion", would follow.

But for the efforts of an impressive number of sources scattered in different organisations, it would have not been possible to attempt the type of analysis ventured here. Given a choice, I would have gratefully acknowledged them all. In their own interest, unfortunately, they must remain anonymous.

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attempts have termed this transformation as haphazard growth<sup>2</sup>. This piece would historically examine whether the developmental history of Bombay bears this out. The analysis would be sub-divided in to three sections : the first would interpret the logic and methodology of Bombay's growth until the publication of the Development Plan in 1964; the second would examine the genesis and birth of New Bombay in 1970; and the third would link it up with the attempts to convert the Bombay Metropolitan Region (BMR) into Bombay Metropolitan City in 1981.

## I

### Logic and Methodology of Bombay's Growth

Bombay's history begins around 200 B.C. and its present identity, physical and functional structure represent a planned effort roughly extending 2200 years. Instead of constructing the complete history of the city in all its details, we have opted to confine ourselves to the analysis of the pattern of important events in Bombay's history to identify the logic and methodology of its growth. Table 1 compiles important historical events connected with the growth of the city between 200 B.C. and 1981 A.D. From the table, the following patterns emerge :

Table - 1

Important Events in Bombay's History, Their Purposes and  
Consequences : 200 B.C. - 1981 A.D.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
200 B.C.	Presence of Western coast (including Mysore, Berar and Deccan) in the Maurya empire.
178 B.C.	Passage of Thana coast to Shatakarnis and enrichment of direct sea trade with Egypt, and Persia.
190 B.C. Kon	Following trade relations, political conquest of Konkan by the Parthians of Persia and founding of Kshatrapa dynasty's rule in Konkan; rise of Kalyan and Chaul to the rank of regular marts.
400 A.D.	Rule of Rashtrakutas in the north Konkan; trade with Ceylon and Persian gulf through Kalyan.
615	Chaulakya rule in Konkan.
637	Refuge by several bands of Persians on Thana coast following conquest of Persia by the Arabs; plundering of Thana coast by Arabs through several raids.
810-1260	Emergence and rule of 20 kings of Silhara dynasty; construction of high road, and several temples; Puri as their capital and Sanjan, Thana, Sopara, Chaul, Lonad, and Uran places of note.
1280	Rise of Yadavas of Devgiri, establishment of headquarters at Karnala and Bassein.
1294	Allauddin Khilzi of Delhi conquers Ramdev of Devgiri and makes him tributary; flight of Bhimdev, son of Ramdev, to Mahim.
1300	Colonisation of Mahim by Bhimdev, building of temples and palaces.
1371	Occupation of Mahim and the salsette by Mubarak Shah.
1430	Passage of West coast (Gujarat to Mahim) to the Gujarat Sultans.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1978	Growth of Sultans, annexation of domain to include Daman, Agashi, Sopara, Bassein, Bhiwandi, Kalyan, Bombay and Panvel; development of Thana and Mahim as ports.
1497	Vasco da Gama appears on the Coromondal coast, Portuguese forage raids on Dabol and Mahim; ceding of Mumbadevi by the Sultan of Ahmedabad to the Portuguese.
1517	Bombardment of Mahim by the Portuguese.
1535-1660	Portuguese control of the Bombay islands and nearby mainland areas after a number of battles; treaty with the Sultan of Gujarat ceding Bassein Fort with its territory, island and salsette to the Portuguese; the entry of British at Surat, establishment of castle.
1664	<u>Gifting of Bombay islands by the Portuguese to the English in dowry (remaining areas continuing with the Portuguese); appearance on the scene of Capt. Cooke and East India Company; decision to build a town for the trading class; disputes on rights of land; Co-Directors decide to purchase all lands and shift fishermen and create accommodation for its houses.</u>
1674	Meeting of all landed proprietors called by the Governor Aungiers to settle land disputes; settlement by agreement with the occupants to get possession on payment; building of settlement for English settlers with administrative offices near Customs Bunder.
1675	Conversion of old court of judicature at the south east of present Cooperage into a hospital to protect the health of British immigrants.
1696	Market for selling fruits, vegetables, flowers set up at Fort.
1664-1700	Intermittent wars between the Moghuls, Sidis and Portuguese to gain control of each others' territories.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1717	Raising of Fort walls with three gates (Appollo at the south, Churchgate at the west and Bajar gate at the north) with the port and castle in the centre; <u>reservation of southern portion for English and northern for the native population.</u> All roads led from the castle outwards through gates. Indiscriminate building activity within Fort north in the absence of any building control.
1733	Relocation of Cooperage hospital to Marine Yard.
1739	Banning of building activity within 100 yards of town walls (unless permitted); building activity needed a license; beginning of Esplanade expanding 800 yards of open space around Fort; filling up of area in Fort and spillover of settlement beyond Fort.
1748	Consyruction of a dry dock.
1750	Movement of the Governor to Parel to make permanent residence at Jesuit property; movement of European settlers toward Mazgaon and Mahim; overcrowding of Fort north; fast development of areas beyond Fort; laying of road from Churchgate to Sonapur.
1769	Meat and fowl sheds added to the Fort market.
1771	Elimination of Marathas, Sidis and Portuguese; unchallenged control of the harbour islands and the salsette by the British.
1776	Establishment of Mohmed market at Sheikh Menon Street.
1787	Appointment of a <u>Committee to investigate encroachments within Fort</u> and extent to which buildings were <u>prejudicial to public health</u> ; recommended, as a preventive measure, <u>a restriction on heights of buildings,</u> wider streets and <u>several other suggestions relating to encroachments and cleanliness;</u> <u>suggestions shelved on the grounds of practical expediency.</u>
1800	Hospital for the native troops at Esplanade and a canvalescent home at Old Women's Island, Colaba.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1803	<p>Great fire within Fort area; Committee appointed to advise on rebuilding of the town; provided an opportunity for rebuilding this part of the town; advised natives to settle in Mandvi area, open and with straight and cross roads without any planning; <u>poorer sections moved first; the rich resisted and opposed the Fort Plan.</u> Fort was, therefore, rebuilt on existing foundations with wider roads built on surrendered lands.</p> <p>Conversion of Governor's horse stable in to a mutton and vegetable market.</p>
1804	<p>Proclamation requiring clearance of a further area of 800 yards from Fort walls as engineers' limit for defence purposes; <u>accommodation of affected people on government owned land in Khara Talao, Kumarwada, Kamathipura, central part of Khetwadi (between main and back roads), eastern Bhuleshwar, and Western Kumharwada; open land, so new buildings bad. Muslims, sea faring, put near port; Hindus in Kumharwada and Kamathipura; land lease without control on land use; unplanned buildings grew in Girgaum, Thakurdwar, Panaswadi, Mazgaon, Mahim, Poibadevi; reclamation of salt batty (Foras) land by town sweepings; use of Foras and Toka (private cultivated) lands for unrestricted building activity without reference to government; much damage done.</u></p>
1809	<p>Destruction of Mohmed market in a fire and its reconstruction and renaming as Duncan market.</p> <p>A sort of hospital set up for the natives.</p>
1824	<p>Closure of Marine Yard hospital in favour of a new hospital at Hornby Road for the use of both the European civilians and garrison population.</p>
1830	<p>Opening up of the ghats by road and the cotton supply routes conceding persistent demand of the business class.</p>
1834	<p>Opening of several private dispensaries on persistent public demand.</p>
1836	<p>Formation of Committee of Native Dispensary to bring home to the public full medical benefits.</p>

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1837	Fruit and vegetable market established at Erskine Road; appointment by the Court of Petty Sessions (governing the city in that period) of a clerk of markets to supervise sale of all commodities.
1838	Construction of Colaba causeway linking last remaining island.
1842	Construction of drainage and a new outfall at Hornby Vellard.
1845	Water deficiency problem raised; Graham and Leith Committee recommends acquisition of some private wells for public use; government asks Chief Engineer to report on improvement of water supply; construction of reservoirs in sandstone strata suggested; <u>non</u> -acceptance by government; emphasis on avoidance of water wastage; further study of proposals.
1846	Capt. Turner's proposal of interception water project at Malabar Hill not accepted; Capt. Crawford suggests first scheme of Vehar lake; later submits a second one.
1841-48	Political conquest of the Deccan accomplished by the British.
1850	Third Vehar scheme by Capt. Crawford and its improvement by Lt. Delisle.
1851	First textile mill established in the city.
1852	Conybeare plan of tapping water bearing strata not approved; government revived and approved Vehar scheme.
1853	G.I.P. Rail link upto Thana opened.
	Conception and consideration of various schemes of drainage and sewage; experiments on tidal variations to determine the effect of sewage disposal; non-approval of eastern and western foreshores and area near Lighthouse due to nearness to cantonment as sites for sewage outfalls.
1856	Vehar scheme of water supply undertaken.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1860	<p>Completion of Vehar scheme and receipt of water by tapes.</p> <p>Closure of Hornby hospital and use of Artillery barracks in Fort George as hospital as a temporary measure.</p>
1861	<p>Appointment of a Committee to examine the land fortification; recommends removal of the walls and profitable use of the area so released; <u>building activity within Esplanade sought to be controlled in respect of character, style, and architecture.</u></p> <p><u>Establishment of the Bombay Municipality under the Municipal Act 1861</u>; introduction of section 194 in the act to require owners/occupants of markets to pave them to the satisfaction of the Commissioner.</p>
1862	<p>Appointment of the <u>Rampart Removal Committee</u>; proposed (a) a definite plan for laying roads, water supply, and drainage; (b) the use of available space for building and location of sites for public buildings.</p> <p>Establishment of Bombay Gas Company.</p>
1863	<p>Extension of G.I.P. Rly through the ghats to provide all weather trading connections with the mainland.</p> <p>Widening of Colaba causeway.</p>
1864	<p>Connection of Bombay with the B.B. &amp; C.I. Rly.</p>
1865	<p>Building of Crawford market by Municipal Commissioner Crawford.</p> <p>Appointment of <u>Esplanade Fee Committee</u> to develop a road system; laid several roads in the Fort area.</p> <p>Appointment of Burial Commission to investigate complaints of nuisance caused by burial grounds; recommended re-siting at Matunga (including the Parsi towers of silence); <u>not implemented due to huge cost</u>; only area near Antop Hill at Matunga was earmarked for cemeteries while existing burial grounds were walled and allowed to continue.</p> <p>Establishment of Bombay Municipal Corporation under an act to govern the city.</p>

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1861-65	Speculative craze; increased wealth led to construction of major buildings (the P.O., Secretariat, Convocation Hall and Library of the University, High Court Telegraph Department, J.J. School of Arts, Sassoon Institute), establishment of financial and shipping companies; ambitious Back Bay reclamation scheme (originally designed to carry B.B. & C.I. Rly to Colaba to serve Cotton Green), construction of buildings; reclamation carried out extending from Customs House to Sewri along Modi Bay through Elphinstone, Mazgaon, Tank Bunder, and Frere schemes.
1866	Building of J.J. Hospital through a major donation at Parel.
1866-67	Construction of Carnac, Elphinstone, and Masjid bridges and laying of five major roads.
1867	Shifting of European cemetery from Sonapur to Sewri. Establishment of Bandra slaughter house.
1868	Opening of weekly mail service with foreign countries.  Need for a second source of water (apart from Vehar) felt. Aitken submits Shewla (25 m.g.), Kanhere (8 m.g.), Tulsi (14 m.g.) and Powai (2 m.g.) costing Rs.140, 41.5 40, and 35.5 lakhs respectively; only Tulsi approved.  Gutting in fire of a private market at Bhuleshwar and building of a municipal market at the site; establishment of Phule market and private markets at Janjekar Street, Rampart Row, and Tank Bunder.
1870	Closing of Colaba cemetery.
1872	Commencement of Tulsi water supply scheme.
1873	Constitution of the Bombay Port Trust (BPT) to manage dock area from Colaba to Mazgaon.
1874	Sanction of government grant to J.N. Wadia Dispensary at Mahim, completion of Gokuldas Tejpal Native Hospital to serve those away from the J.J. Hospital; opening of N. Petit Charitable Dispensary.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1875	Construction of wet Sassoon dock.
1877	Commissioning of municipal Peddar market at Mazgaon.
1878	Introduction of section 241 in the Municipal Corporation Act to discourage new private markets, and control the existing ones.
1879	Tulsi scheme of water supply (14 m.g.) completed; more demand for water.
1880	Construction of Princess Dock.
1884	Construction of night soil depots along the main channel to wash it in the sea.
1885	Establishment of a temporary hospital for the women at Khetwadi by the Bombay Committee of the Medical Fund.
1886	Jaffer Suleman Dispensary for outpatients opens near Crawford market; closure of Khetwadi hospital with the opening of P.H. Cama Hospital.
1888	Execution of Tansa water supply scheme (18.8 m.g.).
1888	Completion of Victoria Docks.
1890	Incorporation in the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act Bill amendments to the Municipal Act 1861 in respect of markets and slaughter houses empowering it to govern establishment, maintenance and working of markets.
1890	B.E. Albless Obstetric Hospital opened in the Cama Hospital premises; Ackworth Leper Asyleum at Matunga built;
1891	Powai water supply scheme completed; water not of as good quality as others, needs filter treatment.
1891	Merewheather dry dock built.
1891	Location of an infections disease hospital at Grant Road at the outbreak of epidemic; closure after it is over.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1892	<p>Extension of building control, exercised in Esplanade to Marine Lines and Chowpatty.</p> <p>Water made available from Tansa scheme.</p> <p>Replacement of obstetric ward from J.J. Hospital by Motlibai Wadia Hospital; reopening of infectious disease hospital at Arthur Road; building of Ackworth Leprosy Home at Wadala.</p>
1894	<p>Establishment of municipal sheep market at Delisle Road (shifted later).</p>
1895	<p>Establishment of composite Colaba market at Lala Nigam Road.</p>
1896	<p>Great plague hits; establishment of the <u>Improvement Trust</u> to i) lay new roads, ii) improve crowded localities, iii) reclaim further lands, and iv) provide accommodation for police; the insanitary conditions prevailing brought to the fore; mass exodus apart from heavy loss of life; commenced schemes : 1) <u>Complete clearance</u> of areas suggested to it and selected by it; <u>enbloc clearance</u> of five areas (Nagpada, Mandvi, Kolwada, Naoroji Hill, Kholbhatwadi, Bhatwadi); six congested areas provided arterial/roads; <u>heavy financial commitment for developing the outlying parts of the city</u> (Nagpada, Sewri, Worli, Koliwada) made it impossible to implement; 2) <u>Road Schemes</u> : primarily to facilitate and maintain north south thorough fare for speedy transport; areas like Malabar Hill, Princess Street opened through major roads; 3) <u>Reclamation of low areas under Dadar, Matunga, Sewri, Wadala, Sion schemes for accommodating the poor</u>; prohibitive cost made this beyond the reach of poor; 4) <u>Accommodation Schemes</u> : a) for persons affected by several schemes b) for police. These are single room tenements; a few changes for the mill employees. <u>Much of reclaimed land made over to the Bombay Development Department for industrial workers.</u></p>
1903	<p>Proposal of J.N. Tata and also others to reclaim 1500 acres of Mahim woods; not approved by the Government.</p>

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1904	Reclamation of a portion of harbour side of Colaba by the military.
1907	Establishment of Tata Iron & Steel Company.
1909	<p>Issue of Government Questionnaire seeking opinion on the development schemes. Issues : 1) <u>segregation of areas according to income</u>, 2) <u>coordinating and improving different channels of communication</u>, and 3) <u>mode of travel suitable for displaced population</u>. Replies favoured respective interests.</p> <p><u>Formulation of city development policy for next twenty years and its intention to introduce Town Planning Act similar to the Acts prevailing in England and Germany to place a limitation on the land lords in respect of built up area, heights and constructions and to bring them in conformity with the alignment of roads proposed in the scheme; Recommendations : 1) Western shores should provide accommodation to the wealthy class. Since Mahim was too distant and Worli was fouled by sewage disposal schemes, Back Bay reclamation only solution; 2) Transfer of right to reclaim from Improvement Trust to the government through legislation; 3) No earmarking of areas for the middle class but areas vacated by wealthy class were to be available for this purpose; 4) Development of northern areas for those who could afford; 5) Accommodation of labour near their factories; 6) Improvement of road system by the Improvement Trust and Bombay Port Trust; 7) Rejection of proposals to terminate B.B. &amp; C.I. Rly (present Western) at Grant Road and G.I.P. Rly (present Central) at V.T. (via Parel) on the ground that it would cause congestion and prevent expansion of railways.</u></p>
1910	Drafting of building bye laws to regulate building structures in the city.
	Establishment of Tata Hydro Electric Supply Company Ltd.
1912	Tansa duplication scheme taken up as water scarcity felt.

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Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)

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Government decision to review the progress made (in the city development) by the Improvement Trust and determine necessity of changes in the priorities; appointment of representative Development Committee to report on 1) Shifting of some institutions (University, High Court), 2) whether reclamation was only alternative for expansion; 3) should reclamation be large scheme to be implemented in parts or small scheme to be expanded later?; approached development of Bombay under the following heads: 1) what is the existing trend of development in respect of a) industry and a definite policy for its control; b) commerce and the resultant demand of office accommodation, c) residential accommodation and how the development of town be best served under the last two? 2) what are the pressing needs of the Bombay area in respect of sanitation, light and air? 3) future development of institutions of educational, scientific, public or medical character? 4) what are the best methods to achieve the desired result consistent with the growth of the city? and 5) what additional means of communications would be necessary as a consequence? Recommends.

1) All offensive trade and other factories and large industries should be restricted in future to the north-eastern corner of the island and salsette.

2) North-East of Fort area was congested with large commercial offices. An improvement scheme was suggested for Fort north.

3) Improvement of Love Grove pumping station (sewage) to enable Worli Sea face available for residential development for the richer class. With improvement in communications, the middle class could settle in the suburban areas or Improvement Trust schemes in the north.

4) Slum conditions due to absence of stricter building bye-laws. Shifting of railway workshops from the central parts of the city and housing for employees by Mill owners could help avoid slum conditions.

5) No shifting of public and semi-public institutions. Residential development area available by the shift of Cotton Green (from Colaba to Sewri); additional reclamation of 100 acres at Colaba opposite Oval to accommodate the several proposed institutions (Council Hall, College of Commerce, Elephinstone Middle School, Law School, and Extension to Government Secretariat; This

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
	<p>started the second phase of Back Bay reclamation).</p> <p>6) Additional line between salsette and Grant Road necessary; railway line upto Colaba necessary to serve the reclaimed areas. Sinking of railway line below ground to avoid smoke nuisance; if this was not porrible, terminus at Churchgate; many proposals of tramway and bus services extending them upto Worli in the West and Dadar and King's Circle in the centre (but not materea-lized).</p> <p>7) Shifting of military installations and use of freed land for civic purposes.</p> <p>8) Coordination between different statutory bodies for a more integrated approach for the development of Bombay. <u>Government did not give effect to the recommendations as it got busy with the First World War.</u></p> <p>Mackinson Plan for the development of Mahim proposing clearance of the woods, filling up of marshy land and laying out of roads connecting it with areas lying in its south, east, north and west.</p>
1914	Completion of Alexandra wet dock and Hughes dry dock.
1915	<p>Formation of Advisory Committee by the Government to report on the specific schemes on which the government support could be received.</p> <p>Tansa duplication scheme completed. Total supply of water on its completion 35 m.g.</p> <p>Passage of Bombay Town Planning Act; not applicable to the city of Bombay (since it was mainly for areas being newly developed) but could be extended to the city on an application to the Government by the Municipal Corporation. Mahim area applicable but not applied due to local opposition.</p> <p>Establishment of a slaughter house at Arthur Road.</p>
1916	The establishment of Andhra Valley Power Supply Company Ltd. by the Tata group to generate power at Bhivpuri.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1917	A syndicate of prominent businessmen (Sassoon, Bharucha, Fazalbhoy, Thackersey, Samaldas) formed to form a company to undertake reclamation work; the Government did not approve working of private companies in this field.
1918	Establishment of Directorate of Industries replacing the Industrial Advisory Committee, created 'favourable' climate for industrial development in Bombay.
1919	Tata Power Company Ltd. established to bring power from Bhera.  Municipal Corporation offers Powai chemically treated water supply to the suburbs, then functioning as independent towns; the government to build servicing reservoir and lay distribution system; Tansa completion scheme increases water supply from 40 to 90 m.g. No shortage of water for next 20 years.
1920	<u>Non-implementation of most development schemes of the government, Improvement Trust, Port Trust, Municipal Corporation due to preoccupation with war.</u>  Replacement of Directorate of Industries with the Development Directorate; charged with the task of executing industrial schemes at Trombay (3243 acres), Kurla-Kerol (1613), Kapoli Tail Water scheme, Kalyan-Ambernath (1289 acres) and supply and distribution of electric power.  Establishment of Nair Hospital.
1922	Construction of a refrigeration and cold storage building at Phule market.  Rushing through legal formalities and start of Back Bay Reclamation scheme covering an area of 1144 acres between Colaba and Parsi Gymkhana at Marine Lines; divided in to eight blocks; reservation of 145 acres for parks and play grounds, 100 acres for public buildings, 27 acres for educational purposes and 28 acres for other recreational use; the work of execution given to the Development Directorate of the Improvement Trust; leakage in the sea wall; cost triplication; loss in revenue due to trade depression; decline in profits from the scheme; trenchant criticism.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1926	<p>Appointment of Mears Committee to investigate Back Bay Project work; recommended different methods of reclamation for different blocks and filling up of the reclaimed land upto uniform level; further reclamation proposals for Back Bay and Walkeshwar withheld.</p> <p><u>Dissolution of the Improvement Trust due to financial strain; handing over of bulk of its work to the Municipal Corporation under an act.</u></p> <p>Establishment of K.E.M. Hospital as a memorial to King Edward VII at a cost of Rs.53 lakhs (attachment of Goverdhandas Sunderdas Medical College to it later.</p>
1927	Opening of municipal market at Chowpatty.
1929	Purchase of land, its development on the lines of the Improvement Trust and laying of Shivaji Park at Dadar by the Municipal Corporation.
1930	Construction of municipal market at Chembur.
1933	Establishment of Nair Dental College.
1938	Report of the <u>Industrial Housing Commission</u> recommending a <u>ban on location of industry in the city except in the north-east and south-eastern salsette; not given effect.</u>
1939	Building of Gold Mohur Castle Wholesale Municipal Market at Bycuta.
1940	Publication of <u>Barlow Report</u> endorsing the recommendations of the Industrial Housing Commission; <u>nothing much done by the government.</u>
1941	Establishment of the Tata Memorial Cancer Hospital.
1942	Building of municipal market at Worli.
1943	Shortage of water experienced at the Navy, Port Trust, Defence Services, and the industries engaged in war productions and floating population made heavy demands; heavy pressure water supply hours reduced from eight to six.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1944	Second world war caused <u>straining of municipal finances</u> ; <u>postponement of execution of development works till after the war</u> ; crediting of such accrued money to a separately and statutorily created Post War Reconstruction Fund.
1945	Post War Committee to advise the government on the policy for industrial development particularly 1) question of expansion of existing industries, 2) establishment of new industries, and 3) determination of the extent of government participation in industrial production.  Pressure of population on the sewage system, surcharge of sewers and silting.
1946	Transfer of Nair Hospital and Dental College and Topiwalla Medical College to the Corporation; acquisition of Military Hospital at Dharavi to make it Lokmanya Tilak Hospital.
1947	Reconstitution of Post War Committee into seven sub-committees dealing with i) metal and engineering, ii) chemical, iii) food and forest, iv) textiles, v) miscellaneous, vi) cottage and small scale industries and vii) a special Committee to consider location of industries; recommended location of metal and engineering units in Kalyan-Ambernath, chemical, rayon, and woolen units in Trombay, Kalyan-Ambernath, and food and beeveridges in the city itself.  <u>Amendment of Post War Reconstruction Fund Act 1944 to divert the fund to other pressing needs than originally intended</u> ; non-availability of funds for development work.  <u>Appointment of Post War Development Committee</u> consisting of Albert Mayer and V.N. Modak and comprising three panels dealing with 1) development of suburbs and town planning, 2) housing, and 3) traffic. Recommended i) <u>exile of heavy industries beyond Thana creek</u> , ii) <u>dispersal of light industry to the salsettee</u> , iii) <u>inclusion of large area within the urban limits of Bombay for providing space for expansion and dispersal of the city</u> , iv) <u>an outline of a Master Plan for control on development of the city indicating the manner in which the city,</u>

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
	suburbs and the satellite towns (i.e. Thana, Bessein, Uran) should be planned, v) a second shopping centre at Dadar, vi) commissioning of an underground railway system.
	Rapid industrialization and growth of the suburbs; hours of water high pressure supply further reduced; storage capacity of Tansa increased further; failure of Monsoon; emergency measures included use of pumps to get water supplies.
	Acquisition of the assets and operations of the Bombay Electric Supply and Tramway Company (B.E.S. & T.) under a deed of concession by the Corporation.
1948	Approval of the recommendations of the Post War Development Committee by the Corporation and onward sub-mission to the state government for approval. The plan did not have any legal force, however.
	Establishment of municipal wholesale plainmarket at Byculla.
5117	Proposal of relief sewage schemes, new pumping stations, new sewer lines in the middle part of the city and increase in pumping capacities.
1949	Passage of the Bombay Buildings Works Restrictions Act and introduction of restrictions on <u>industrial location on the island</u> .
1950	Extension of Corporation boundaries to include some suburbs.
1951	Amendment of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act; introduction of zoning to discourage new plants on the island and to direct them to prescribed areas in the northern and north-eastern suburbs.
1954	The passage of Bombay Town Planning Act to remove the limitations of 1915 Act; <u>non-enforcement immediately</u> ; empowered the Corporation to prepare a Master Plans, define land uses and operate development controls.
	Establishment of municipal market at Dongri, pork market at Marine Lines.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
	Replacement of tram services by buses begins.
1956	Establishment of Khar municipal market.
	Vaitarna water supply scheme connecting Vaitarna and Tansa rivers and laying up of pipeline from Tansa to Bombay.
	Passage of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rent Act to prevent frequent and unreasonable enhancement of rents by the proprietors.
	Bringing of all T.B. hospitals of the Corporation (Ramesh Premchand, Maratha, Turner) to Sewri.
1957	Application of Bombay Town Planning Act to Mandvi area, destroyed in the dock explosions of 1944, despite vehement protests from the residents.
	Extension of administrative and jurisdictional limits of Corporation to include additional suburban areas.
1958	Appointment by the state government of the <u>Study Group on Greater Bombay</u> under the chairmanship of S.G. Barve to examine i) the underground railway proposal (given earlier by Mayer and Modak Plan), ii) development of suburbs, iii) decentralization of industry, and iv) housing. The group appointed five Panels.
	Bombay Municipal Corporation decides (Resolution No.409 dated 7th July 1958) to prepare a fresh Development Plan for Greater Bombay.
1959	Barve Group Report recommends 1) <u>ban on all industrial units on the island</u> except where they processed imported raw materials or exported finished goods; 2) permission to small industrial units on the island where they provided services to the existing factories and on the condition that they were located in industrial zones; 3) creation of 20 industrial estates on the island, 25 in the suburbs and 10 additional suburban estates to take 'non-conforming' industries from the city, 4) <u>development of the area on the other side of the harbour with a township to take industry dispersed from the city.</u> The township would, in turn, not only draw away from the island of Bombay the

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
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overflow of industrial units and industrial colonies but also enable the city to develop in an orderly manner; 5) building of a bridge over the Thane creek to assist the above project; 6) endorsed under-ground railway proposal along with other measures to relieve congestion of Fort area (including a new commercial centre at Bandra-Kurla, and relocation of the main government offices on the island), 7) massive housing programme, 8) unified municipal administration to govern the city and a development authority that would include all public agencies (i.e. railways, Port Trust, state and central agencies) concerned with the city.

Acceptance by the Corporation of the Barve Group recommendations for preparing its Development Plan; acceptance by the state government some of its recommendations such as the creek bridge, industrial estates, Bandra-Kurla.

Municipalisation of Garamkhada private market at Lalbaug, building of municipal market at Elphinstone Road, and composite market at King's Circle.

1960 Government takes over Tata Memorial Concer Hospital.

1961 A new seven storeyed building built for J.J. Hospital.

1962 Municipal markets at Takia Ward (Kurla), Mulund and Borivli.

Stepping up of discontinuation of trams as a consequence of ILO Study Team and pressing into service of trolly buses, fleet augmentation, depot construction recommended through major loans.

Establishment of Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (MIDC) to assist industrial development in the state by developing industrial estates, and laying infrastructure (i.e. roads, water, power, drainage, railway sidings); creation of 10 estates in the Bombay metropolitan region, and Kandivli (280 acres) Marol (278 acres) and Bhandup (145 acres) estates in the city.

Submission of the Development Plan for Greater Bombay proposing a total investment of Rs. 700 crores (1964 prices) to be spent in next 20 years; recommended

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
	<p>1) gradual reorganization of its existing structure, 2) establishment and enforcement of zoning, 3) dispersal of population to the suburban areas, decentralization of the industry, and commerce from the city (six business districts, many industrial estates), 4) massive housing, 5) sites for social services, public utilities, and 6) reclamation of 27 kms. of low lying reclaimable land. Financing through a) loans, b) grants-in-aid and subsidies from state, and control agencies, and c) development tax and betterment levy.</p> <p>Specific proposals for augmentation of water, power supply, sewage and drainage, road, rail, transport, educational, medical services; endorsement of the recommendation of the Wilbur Smith Traffic Consultants' proposals involving separate expenditure of Rs.95.92 crores.</p> <p>Selective acceptance of the Plan by the State Government mainly because of pressure from the business class and its reluctance to allow the Corporation to levy development tax and betterment levy.</p>
1965	<p>Third extension of boundaries of the Corporation to include areas upto Dahisar on the Western Railway and Mulund on the Central.</p> <p>Appointment of the Gadgil Committee to enquire into the prospects for the regional plans for Bombay-Panvel and Poona metropolitan regions.</p> <p>Establishment of State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra (SICOM) to administer and publicize an extended package of incentives (than the one done by the MIDC) including arrangement of loans, assistance in project appraisal. No incentives for areas around Greater Bombay (including Thana, Belapur and Taloja which were established and promoted in the first instance by the MIDC) but willing to arrange loans. MIDC expenditure on promotion is three times that of SICOM.</p>
1966	<p>Report of the Gadgil Committee felt that 1) <u>control of business investment was the means to control employment</u></p>

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
	<p>and this was means to prevent growth or reduce the size;  2) additional costs of locating economic activity in Greater Bombay far outweighed any advantages; recommended 1) <u>ban on location of industrial activity in the city</u>, 2) <u>no new offices development in the Fort area</u>, 3) <u>location of new offices in the Bandra-Kurla area</u>, 4) <u>regional plan to curb continuous urban sprawl and extension of city, concentration of population new towns separated from each other by a green belt and in multi-nucleated growth of the Bombay metropolitan region</u>; 5) <u>need of regional planning legislation enabling creation of Regional Metropolitan Boards. Selective acceptance of recommendations by State Government.</u></p>
1967	<p>Passage of Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act 1966 (MRTPA) and constitution of Bombay Metropolitan Regional Planning Board (BMRPB).</p> <p>Organisation of the Modern Architects Research Group (MARG) symposium and other seminars pressing for acceptance of twin city proposal.</p> <p>Lobbying before the BMRPB by the twin city enthusiasts, its decision to debate previous proposals for development of Greater Bombay; change in the initial view of the BMRPB to conclude that 1) all previous proposals were only <u>palliatives</u> 2) Greater Bombay's domination needed to be diluted, 3) only one counter-magnet near enough can do it, 4) area just opposite the harbour was the place because of existing nucleus of industries, proposed port of Nhava-Sheva, capacity to stimulate entire region, 5) cost advantages.</p>
1969	<p>Passage of Bombay Building Repairs and Reconstruction Act to repair unsafe dilapidated buildings in the city.</p>
1979	<p>Report of the BMRPB for the Bombay Metropolitan Region recommending, among others, setting up of a 'metro-centre' on the main land to relieve pressure from Greater Bombay.</p> <p>State government accepts the recommendation to set up a metro centre, designates 95 villages from Thana, Panvel and Urun Tehsils as 'New Bombay', and notifies privately owned land for acquisition.</p> <p>City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra (CIDCO) is formed, as a subsidiary of SICOM and registered under the Companies Act.</p>

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1971	CIDCO is designated as the New Town Development Authority (NTDA) for the New Bombay project.  Passage of Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance Redevelopment) Act.
1973	Approval of the Bombay Metropolitan Regional Plan by the state government.  Publication of New Bombay Draft Development Plan by CIDCO for public comments, suggestions and objections; and submission to the state government for approval.
1975	Passage of Bombay Metropolitan Regional Development Authority Act, to plan and regulate development of the region; constitution of the BMRDA;  Finalization of the New Bombay Development Plan after meeting objections; and re-submission to state government
1976	Passage of Maharashtra Urban Land Ceiling Act and Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act (the latter merging the Bombay Building Repairs and Reconstruction Act in it).
1977	Joint discussion by the representatives of the textile mills, and urban planners to consider the problems involved in shifting the industry out of the city and the decision of the state government to allow the industry to continue undisturbed.
1980	Appointment of Moghe and Awale Committees to consider the problem of slums and dilapidated houses.
1981	Appointment of High Power Steering Group headed by Ajit Kerkar on the problems of slums and dilapidated houses; recommends : 1) <u>natural growth of Bombay</u> and conversion of Bombay Metropolitan Region into Bombay Metropolitan City, 2) 12 year plan with Rs.6390 crores investment plan for long-term housing programme for the poor living in the

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
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slums and decaying buildings, 3) development of Nasik, Tarapur, Roha as satellite towns, 4) establishment of an apex body for provision of uniform infrastructure, social services, and communications, 5) planned renewal and rebuilding of decaying areas of the city and providing housing for poor and those who could afford, 6) use of land as a resource for generating part of funds (through a fee on issue of No Objection Certificates under the MULC Act and sale of government land) to execute the plan.

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Sources : 1) S.M. Edwardes, The Rise of Bombay : A Retrospect, Vol. X of Census of India, Series 1901, (Bombay, 1902); C. Rajagopalan, op cit, Chapter I; Development Plan for Greater Bombay 1964, op cit, XXIII-XXXI; New Bombay : Draft Development Plan, (Bombay, 1973); Report of the High Power Group on Slums and Dilapidated Buildings (Kerkar Group), op cit, Chapter I, and annual reports of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, SICOM, and CIDCO Ltd., Bombay.

Emphasis contributed.

1. In physical terms, Bombay is what its developers, at different points of time, made it, albeit in terms of their periodic and pressing requirements. Since most part of the city is reclaimed on a planned basis, its physical growth sequence very closely approximates with the political and economic events which took place affecting the main driving force controlling and directing the life and limb of the city. In the earliest period, the place was nothing beyond the base of the fishermen, the centre of trade and politics at that time lying in the coastal Konkan. At the end of intermittent change of hands, the islands finally passed on to the Portuguese who gave them as a dowry to the British. The British planned and made it a city of and for the traders. Significantly enough, historically the city has grown from the southern end and not from the side of the mainland with which it is nudging in a real sense only now. Apart from reclamation, periodic outer physical expansion has almost always involved some physical realignment in the southern part. These extensions and expansions have been subject to the conflicting needs of an alien power, the comprador industry and commerce and the native poor in the British period and the business class, and middle and working classes in the post-independence period.

The task of developing the city physically changed hands periodically. In the very beginning, it was with the British themselves working as the government. It was passed on to the Municipality around 1861 and to the Improvement Trust in 1896.

Thereafter a large number of additional agencies appeared on the scene as the city and various system managing institutions (i.e. the Bombay Port Trust, the two Railways, airport, other agencies) grew and started making and executing independent physical development decisions without necessarily integrating them with the overall concept and functions of the city. The government itself remained in the wings retaining the right to intervene but seldom exercising the central cementing and integrating function in the development work. The dissolution of the Improvement Trust in 1926 and transfer of its functions to the Corporation did not help the matters in any significant way in as much as the Corporation did not have over-riding powers to regulate and control the pattern of development brought about by a plethora of agencies. As the size and complexities of single problems being faced increased in the city, specialized single and even multi-function agencies (i.e. Housing Repairs Board, Housing Board, CIDCO, BMRDA, etc.) were added in the post-independence period. Thus, whereas generation of structural problems was cumulative, articulation and solution management was segmented and overall management of the city was the sole responsibility of an institution not endowed with commensurate powers.

2. Physical development of the city, location and siting of different component elements governing city's growth (manufacturing, servicing, office sectors) and adjustment of

differential growths of city's component elements deciding ratios of population to housing and other services, work trips to traffic capacities, capacities of the utilities to their actual load, and so on has always been governed by several pronounced biases. First, the alien rulers, the native rich and wealthy were given a preferential residential location in the western shore areas (Malabar Hills, Peddar Road, Foreshore Road, Cumbulla Hills, Juhu-Vile Parle Scheme, etc.) which still continues. Second, the location of refuse and other disposal systems (sewage, drainage, burial, etc.) were, as far as possible, kept away from the rich areas. Third, in laying of circulation network the entire city's needs were first subordinated to the requirements of the rich and wealthy. Still later, needs of other sections were sporadically attended to with grudging allocation of attention and resources. Fourth, in the actual sequence of provision of the essential civic, social and other services, the ones needed more by the business class came first. Fifth, whereas the requirements were worked out on the per-capita basis assuming no differentials in their availability and use, the actual distribution network and usage technology and pattern made unequal availability favour the rich. Sixth, the quantum of services needed almost always lagged behind significantly than the one actually provided. Seventh, the drawl of inputs showed the pattern from the immediate neighbourhood to distant areas (i.e. water, power, other inputs, etc.) with the result that the expansion of the city

not only increased the quantum of demand but also the distances of their supplies involving laying out of lengthy and costly supply lines. As the time passed, every such expansion in the capacities of supplies was not only going beyond the capacities of the Corporation; jumping even the capacities of the state government it was becoming dependent upon the stiff-conditioned loans from international agencies. The supplying periphery also suffered as a consequence. Eight, whereas the Corporation was statutorily obliged to provide only some of the services from the total package needed by an emerging elitist-oriented city, the state was coming forward to provide only a few of the remaining. The business and the elitist class, therefore, built a number of servicing institutions quite a few of which acquired an exclusive character.<sup>3</sup> These institutions were not of much use to the mass of Bombay's population although many of these were (and are) well known names.

3. Despite the fact that the meticulous British played a major role in shaping the structure of the city, it comes as a surprise that not a single overall conceptual town planning exercise was carried out for the city until the year 1909. And yet, the fact remains that a large number of committees addressed themselves to periodic predilections and shifting areas of concern over the state of the city. Even these periodic responses were also rather forced ones, precipitated generally by one calamity/emergency or another. The pattern of response which

emerges is that of selected problem articulation and still greater selective orientation in attempting their solutions. Most often the solution pushed involved reducing the quantum or quality or both of the available service/facility to the citizens. The two wars and the period immediately thereafter mark crucial watersheds which indicate the lengths to which city's needs could be neglected. Yet, it would be entirely incorrect to conclude that no planning was involved in the city's development. On the other hand, it was not planning of the city as a whole and for the entire population as these exercises generally went but planning of parts and for certain classes of its citizenry. This type of planning involved overlooking and ignoring the problems which affected the common man : it consisted of finding excuses for deferring their solutions (i.e. not properly studied, no funds, etc.). It also involved finding justifications, real and imaginary, to push through solutions in the name of poor to benefit the rich (i.e. talking of shifting the trade and industry and actually shifting the population). It is remarkable that none of the later day committees have addressed themselves to the development of the parallel black economy and parallel systems which have caused, among other things, a) steep increase in economic crimes, b) emergence of smuggling as a major profession with its own procurement, distribution, markets, payment system, c) the growing magnitude of unauthorized activity in almost every field, d) the prominence of black money white conversion

industries (i.e. films, building construction, estate, tourism, hotels and restaurants, etc.), e) the commercialisation of the misery and sufferings of the millions, f) the development of Mafia systems (i.e. the underworld, the fanatic groupings, the goonda unions, etc.) to eliminate the clout of citizen groups, and working class organisations, g) the huge clandestine funding of ruling apparatus promoting illegal and unauthorized projects, h) enormous unlisted and unorganised living, manufacturing and trading establishments, and i) the more pronounced penetration and assertion of the capitalist class in the affairs of the state. Precisely because these parallel systems run the show in the city and the people controlling them are better off that the crushing problems of the common citizen remain unattended.

4. The methodology of Greater Bombay's growth had been evolved, perfected and patented before the publication of the Development Plan for Greater Bombay in 1964. This methodology was systematic and indicated a design : it involved a) laying the routes for industrial spillover in the immediate fringe zones through provision of infrastructure by several agencies of the state government (i.e. the Department of Industries, the MIDC, and even the SICOM), b) first leaving the areas to the enguinity and greed of the private developers milking bone-dry their commercial potential with the Bombay Municipal Corporation generally inheriting only the giagantic size of

problems and liabilities later, and c) periodic extension of the limits of the Corporation to administratively formalize the economic annexation. The logic of this methodology forced expansion and dispersion of the city and not the economic activity as many of the Development Committees and Study Groups recommended. The business class argued that Bombay was a city of the business men and should remain that way.

## II

### Bombay Development Plan (1964) and New Bombay's Birth

The publication of the Development Plan for Greater Bombay disturbed an otherwise smooth working equilibrium for the business class. Its opposition to the Plan stemmed from the following considerations :

1. It was putting an end to the growth - spillover - annexation - growth - schema which had enabled them to pocket all the gains with the municipal and other public agencies on the one hand and the general public on the other bearing all the 'pains' involved. Above all, while the horizontal spread in the suburbs and beyond and vertical growth in the island part of the city (more particularly the southern most tip and western parts) continued displacing, and de-stablizing the residences, unemployment, and changing the relationship of residence to work, they themselves and their economic activities remained

stayed put. In fact, by the very nature of their stabilized and undisturbed existence they expanded their activities without necessarily expanding in a physical sense. By recommending decentralization of industry and commerce from the city to the suburbs and beyond and from non-conforming to conforming zones, it was not only going to disturb their harmonized, peaceful existence but also increase their capital costs in establishing themselves at a different site all over again. Whereas office sector growth in the Back Bay was continuing it was not possible to expand other activities significantly any further without making huge investments. The city had already spread itself all over, upto the Bassein creek in north west and Thane creek in the north east. Further exploitation of the growth - spillover - annexation schema required crossing of the creeks and moving on to the mainland. And it had to be done quite quickly.

2. The business class had treated the recommendations of previous Committees and Groups with scant respect and flouted them with contemptuous ease. The Development Plan was, however, no routine Committee to be cast aside and overlooked. Under the Bombay Town Planning Act, it acquired legally enforceable clout once it was approved by the state government. The Municipal Corporation had already approved it and unless it was convincingly flogged the state government might end up in approving all that it was proposing.

3. Supporters of both the dominant streams of the business class (the Assocham and the FICCI) in Bombay always preferred to deal with the top echelons of the ruling party, with which they maintained very close links through pursuit of a number of strategies.<sup>4</sup> After the dissolution of the Improvement Trust in 1926 the Corporation had also been entrusted the task of development apart from performing the statutory duties of municipal governance. Although the state of Bombay first and Maharashtra later had un-interrupted stint of Congress rule since independence, no single party had enjoyed a clear majority in the Corporation till then. Patronage-vending through the Corporation's corridors was a pretty tortuous route, one not to the liking of the business class. The Plan was going to be implemented under the overall guidance of elected city fathers and supervised by 'petty officials' of the Corporation.

4. The Development Plan proposals were bare aggregations of different itemized demands: they lacked conceptual clarity and integration. Yet, if they were conceded to be the pressing immediate needs of Bombay, as was likely to happen, scarce state financial resources would be allocated to them. It would then become a harder task to persuade the government to find additional funds for laying infrastructure for the business class. And when it invested mostly funds of others in starting and running their economic units, it was surely not expected to cough up money for development work.

### Strategy Used in Tarpedoeing Development Plan

Once the business class had decided to tarpedoe the Development Plan, it was faced with two immediate tasks : first, in the short-run, approval of all of its proposals had to be some how stopped, and second, another alternative had to be offered to the state government in such a fashion as to secure its approval. To achieve the first purpose, the following two-step strategy was used :

1. To bring pressure on the Maharashtra Chief Minister, V.P. Naik to hold back a decision on the approval all the provisions of the Development Plan.
2. To attack the Development Plan in terms of its objectives, comprehensiveness, and appropriateness.

Maharashtra (and Bombay) Chief Ministers had shown a tendency to become willing game of Bombay's business class and prior to V.P. Naik, Morarji Desai and Y.B. Chavan had been no exceptions. Naik was an improvement on all others in terms of his alignment with the business class and was persuaded fairly easily. To persue the second step, an informal group representing urban planners, business, trade, and manufacturing interests and having very close links with important politicians and civil servants was formed. Between the publication of the Development Plan in 1964 and acceptance

of the New Bombay idea by the BMRPB in 1969, this group organised a high pressure campaign against the Development Plan through discussions, seminars, conferences, media build-up and intense lobbying in a very determined manner. Apart from newspaper reportage and oral corroboration from some of the participants in such events, some published proceedings of its activities are also available.<sup>5</sup>

The initial thrust of this campaign was to exploit the self-admitted limitations and contradictions of the Development Plan. Professing to 'reorganize the existing structure' on the ~~one~~ hand, and 'dispersal of the (city's) population to the suburban areas and decentralization of the industries and commerce' on the other, it was also simultaneously hoping 'to prevent large scale dislocation and undue hardship to people'.<sup>6</sup> It admitted that 'complete solutions to all Bombay's problems lie much further ahead than can be envisaged in any one plan' and that the plan was attempting 'only part solutions'.<sup>7</sup> Further it provided the clinching rationale for its opponents by stating that : a) it covers only the area within the jurisdiction of the Bombay Municipal Corporation, b) with a comprehensive control on development in Greater Bombay there would be a tendency for haphazard development on the periphery outside Greater Bombay where local taxation would also not perhaps be high, c) opening of Greater Bombay with the commissioning of Thane creek bridge and proposed Uran bridge would bring still

more areas on the mainland nearer the commercial centre, d) commissioning of alternate port (at Nhava-Sheva), e) there was need for regional plan for the area around and including Greater Bombay dealing with major problems connected with communications and use of land from the stand point of the region as a whole than from that of separate districts that would constitute the region.<sup>8</sup> Another handy argument provided by the Development Plan was its proposal to levy development tax and betterment levy to raise part of the resources for its implementation.<sup>9</sup> There was an outcry from the citizens against this any way. Additional fuel was added to this opposition by very clever exploitation of the total financial size of the Plan. Its opponents made it look as though its entire outlay of Rs.700 crores was needed in one go.<sup>10</sup>

This strategy culminated in the decision of the Maharashtra Government appointing the Gadgil Committee to consider Bombay's problems in the regional context. However, the second objective of the business class still remained. The second stage of the strategy of the business class involved evolving an alternative, concrete framework on which the attention could then be got focussed. This job was undertaken by the trio of Charles Correa, Pravina Mehta and Shirish Patel through a joint article (called MARG piece hereafter) which gave concrete shape to the alternative being sought to be projected by the business class before the Maharashtra

Government.<sup>11</sup> This piece deserves a closer scrutiny for several reasons :

1. At a single place it establishes the fact that the idea of New Bombay on the mainland across the harbour and opposite Greater Bombay was developed as an alternative to the Development Plan. In the debate which ensued on the relative merits of the Development Plan and the counter-magnet on the mainland, the other important issue of developing several satellite towns near Greater Bombay, referred to earlier by Barve Group was really not given its due consideration.
2. It provides fascinating evidence of groundless reasoning justifying the case of New Bombay. Subsequent events have exposed the hallowness of these arguments.
3. It gives a step by step conceptual delineation of the vision of New Bombay in which the process part, indicating how one step initiated by the agency developing the counter-magnet would lead to a particular consequence, was kept systematically vague and entirely built on pious expectations. No convincing reasons were offered.
4. The document could be treated as some kind of a benchmark frame, from which it was possible to identify the alterations made in the basic vision and structure of New Bombay idea later on. In retrospect, it was then possible to gauge their significance in terms of consequences and motives.
5. The document was written by a trio which later came to occupy crucial decision-making positions in CIDCO, induction of private sector executives in CIDCO, the formulation of the New Bombay Plan and its modifications, award of contracts to these business groups and their surrogates and control by private interests of a public organisation.

The New Bombay thesis built in this document, starts with the argument that the future urban growth should necessarily create entirely new structural pattern (p.30); that existing towns and industries, the nuclei of new towns and

industries would act as magnets to attract the population (p.31); and that to stop the flow of migrants to existing cities, counter-magnets are needed (p.31). Discussion of the alternatives was, like a lawyers' brief, limited to only two : a) to accept the existing centre of activity; or b) create alternative centres of activity to serve as counter-magnet to draw the pressure away (p.33). The first was ruled out : the second was preferred for detailed analysis. Creation of a number of small satellite towns as a technique of redistribution of Greater Bombay's pressures was not favoured on the ground that a) smaller ones would not serve that purpose,<sup>12</sup> b) they had to be sufficiently near, and c) cost of several towns (of 10 lakh population) would be exorbitant (p.36).

The case of New Bombay on the mainland, directly opposite Bombay and of equal prestige and importance, was propped up on the hope that it would develop into as large as the older city; its very large size would provide the equilibrium necessary between old and new development (p.86). It was also argued that if growth still continued the new city could be further ringed later by new satellite towns located close enough so that its presence stimulated their growth (p.36). This was beautifully worked out argument. New Bombay was the solution for Greater Bombay and satellite towns were not. When New Bombay became as big as Greater Bombay and faced

similar problems, satellite towns would look after its problem.

Among other things, New Bombay was expected to stimulate growth in the entire region and act as a focal point for the development of satellite towns. How this would be so was not indicated. The idea was daft since in the first place Greater Bombay had not done so and, in fact, the piece itself argued of a conscious policy to ring them in case New Bombay faced Greater Bombay's problems. The main argument in favour of New Bombay was that it would ~~exploit~~ the magnetic pull of Greater Bombay because it was visually connected with Greater Bombay. No difference appeared to have been made between 'visual' and 'physical' connections. And this meant a lot in terms of circulatory problems involved.

After building a none too convincing case for New Bombay on solid grounds, the piece came to rely on existential justification for New Bombay. It argued that most of the decisions have already been taken by forces operating on this city. Significantly enough, it did not mention the sequentially contradictory roles played by state promotional agencies such as the MIDC and the SICOM in very consciously increasing centralization first in industrial estates in northern Bombay, then in and around Thane, still later in the entire Thane-Bhelapur belt and then "attempting" to disperse them. Whereas

the state government and all its agencies worked in a closely coordinated and concerted manner in siting and locating industrial units near Greater Bombay since the early fifties once there was not much scope left in the metropolis itself,<sup>13</sup> the document stated that they were all working in an unrelated manner (p.41).

The discussion of the financial outlays involved in the implementation of Municipal Development Plan and the New Bombay idea was slanted and partisan. First, while the details of the former, then available, were given under itemized heads, the same were not worked out for the latter. Second, it was argued that the development costs for either location would be practically identical (p.48). This was something unbelievable since it is almost axiomatic that development costs at newer locations for same sized tasks are always significantly higher. Apart from the heavy investment of about Rs.600 crores to be made by various state and central agencies, CIDCO alone is estimated to spend about Rs.1200 crores on nodal and city structure development in New Bombay.<sup>14</sup> Third, only some of the additional costs involved in the latter case were indicated : there were some glaring omissions concealing the cost disadvantages of New Bombay's peculiar terrain, topography and climate. The Panvel creek bridge, constructed by CIDCO, alone has costed roughly Rs.2 crores. One has to wait to learn the staggering estimate of the damming of the Panvel

creek. The trio can't possibly plead ignorance since the piece itself gave fairly useful information about the New Bombay site and maps which later came to be formalized by the state government and the CIDCO. Fourth, it appears that even the selective additional costs given were gross underestimates.<sup>15</sup> Fifth, the cost of land acquisition under the Development Plan, put varyingly at 20 per cent to a quarter, was considered to be very high. It was expected to be 'much less' across the creek. Quite obviously, the propertied class in Greater Bombay was left to be untouched and not to be inconvenienced whereas the poor peasants and fishermen in New Bombay were cheaply dispensable. The calculations were, however, given a decisive blow by the organised resistance of the PWP in New Bombay later. Compensation already paid by CIDCO for 6398.07 ha. of land acquired is Rs.6.39 crores and the total private land in the project area that remains to be acquired would alone cost about Rs.63 crores.

Having made a case for New Bombay on technical, and financial grounds, the document then systematically turns its critical attention on the Development Plan, the Wilbur Smith Report and other proposals which emanated from other sources. It felt that i) the Development Plan would certainly do nothing toward future growth of Greater Bombay; ii) the series of proposals would merely stretch the existing north-south pattern even further (p.49); iii) the plan tended to

escalate land values in the southern part of Greater Bombay even higher; iv) population growth of Greater Bombay would continue; v) it relied on density control which was difficult to achieve; and vi) the proposal of second business centre at Mahim (known later as the Bandra-Kurla scheme) was not feasible because not much area was really available, and at best it could be only a secondary centre not really relieving the pressure on the one in the southern tip, and it would aggravate pressure on the north-south traffic flows (p.49). What the piece seemed to ignore was whether future growth of Greater Bombay was really a desirable planning goal? or whether a planning agency, while planning to ease existing problems of a metropolis, should, at the same time, also plan for further growth? Would its further growth not create additional problems? The Development Plan proposals might have stretched the north-south pattern. However, the essential issue at stake was not of pattern maintenance or structural change. The issue at stake was relieving of the felt pressures on the life and limb of Greater Bombay which the proposals were surely attempting to solve. The escalation in land values of the southern part of Bombay island was being caused by the acute centralization of central functions there and not necessarily by the growth of the city. There was hardly any guarantee that population of Greater Bombay would cease to grow even if New Bombay was started. As it

happened, Greater Bombay's population has continued to leap frog in spite of New Bombay.

The document was harsh on the Wilbur Smith and metro rail proposals and, apart from bus and tube-railway, argued the case of monorail and fast ferry boats (p.53). It appeared that it was more concerned with the transport requirements of the stage where new and old Bombay were fully developed and was not very bothered about the current and interim traffic congestion. According to their own vision, the development of New Bombay was going to take considerable time. In the meanwhile, were the planners to give Greater Bombay's circulatory problems an amused go by? There was hardly any choice but to implement them as is being done slowly now.

#### The Crucial Role of the MARG Piece

Having obtained a concrete alternative framework in the form of twin-city proposal of the MARG piece, the business class went whole hog after the Development Plan. In a series of seminars, symposia, conferences, media build-up, they built a tremendous visibility value of the proposition. However, the MARG piece played most crucial role before the BMRPB, where the initial thinking was anything but favouring the twin-city proposal.<sup>16</sup> In a significant move, the twin-city lobbyists took issue with the with a number of previous pro-

posals on Greater Bombay (including the Development Plan) emphasizing all the time that a) all previous proposals were but only 'palliatives'; b) Greater Bombay's solutions needed a break from the past, c) breaking the domination of Greater Bombay and building a counter-magnet near enough was the only way to draw the pressure away from the city; and d) land could be used as a resource for financing the development of the twin-city saving the use of scarce state finances for such large scale urban development work. Eventually, the BMRPB was persuaded to recommend the twin-city proposal although when the report came out in 1969 there was also a mention of development of satellite towns. The Maharashtra government, which had dilly-dallied a decision on the solution to Greater Bombay's problems, promptly accepted the twin-city proposal of the BMRPB leaving others to gather dust.<sup>17</sup>

#### Considerations Leading to Use of Land as Resource in New Bombay

Four major considerations eventually led the CIDCO Ltd. to use land as a recourse in developing New Bombay.

1. Having attacked the Development Plan before the appointment of the Gadgil Committee and subsequently before the BMRPB, the New Bombay enthusiasts had hardly any choice in proposing another plan of the same financial size for New

Bombay and also hoping to get it approved by the state government. Atleast, the public stand had to be different. Use of land as a resource was, therefore, considered a better initial approval reason to be put before the state government.

2. CIDCO's inner core group consisting of JB D'Souza (Managing Director until 1974), Charles Correa (Chief Consulting Architect until 1974 and member of the Board of Directors thereafter), Shirish Patel (first Technical Advisor, then Director of Public Works and again Technical Advisor till 1974) had previous career experiences which made them feel confident of making New Bombay a commercial proposition. Before taking over as the Managing Director of CIDCO Ltd., D'Souza had been, among other things, the General Manager of the BEST, Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, and Industries Commissioner, Government of Maharashtra. In the late fifties, when it was becoming increasingly difficult to find space for locating additional industrial units in Greater Bombay and the Government of Maharashtra was not willing to allot large funds to develop industrial estates near Greater Bombay, it was he who had built the Wagle Industrial Estate in Thane at a cost of Rs.5 lakhs. Initially, there were no buyers and some plots, disposed in the early phase, were sold at very cheap rates. However, as the time passed there was great demand for the latter lot of plots

and these fetched quite attractive prices.<sup>18</sup> Overall, the estate generated additional funds demonstrating in the process the self-sustaining capacity of such ventures and subsequently led to formation of the MIDC to undertake such assignments on the statewide scale. Charles Correa, the architect, had, among his many consultancy assignments, assisted the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) in designing, developing and marketing many a commercial complex in Delhi and eventually help evolution of a very good financial reserve with the DDA. The DDA experiment had evoked a high critical acclaim from the CIDCO's Planning Team. Similarly, Shirish Patel, an engineering consultant and planner, had helped many an estate developer in Greater Bombay to turn an ugly patch of uneconomic land into a vestibule of goldmine. While shaping of policy inside CIDCO was in the hands of these people, its Planning Team, constituted to act as the think tank and consisting of well known names in their respective fields, tended to reinforce their viewpoint on this issue.

3. A large industrial complex had grown in the Thane-Belapur area, forming part of New Bombay and sooner or later the port of Nhava-Sheva was going to be sanctioned by the Planning Commission. Some important central agencies were moving in the area. Whereas considerable amount of infrastructural facilities had already been built in the area by the MIDC, the major land users in future, according to one viewpoint, were expected to development their chunks of lands

and thus, share the development cost of the city. Major industrial groups (i.e. the Tata, Walchand, Mafatlal) having a larger stake in the area also exerted considerable pressure on the then Maharashtra Chief Minister, Mr. VP Naik giving indications that their employees were expected to buy a large number of housing units in New Bombay.

4. Comparative cost estimates of Development Plan and New Bombay were, as seen earlier, presented to the Maharashtra Government in such a fashion as to give an impression that New Bombay had tremendous advantages. The kingpin of this line of reasoning was expected cheap availability of land in New Bombay. The state government was, thus, persuaded to believe that all that was needed was a reasonable sized loan to the NTDA (CIDCO Ltd.) which would be eventually returned back once the NTDA developed its own revolving fund using land as a resource. The Bombay metropolitan region would stand to benefit tremendously because of development of both the cities without the utilization of a very large sum of scarce state resources.

### III

#### Design to Convert BMR in to Bombay Metropolitan City

Analysis elsewhere would enable us lay theadbare the professed and real objectives of New Bombay.<sup>19</sup> For the present, it is pertinent to emphasize the fact that even after

eleven years of its existence, New Bombay is nowhere near the professed aim of emerging as a counter-magnet to Greater Bombay. Instead of drawing the pressure away from the old city, the new one has been, in fact, adding to the nerve-wrecking problems of the old. However, as we have seen earlier, the real objective of New Bombay idea was to cross the Thane creek and annex parts of the mainland. New Bombay has certainly provided a good enough excuse to the business class to take the next logical step of suggesting another idea incorporating the two cities to carry on the growth - spillover - annexation methodology. With the application of the Maharashtra Urban Land Ceiling Act 1976, the estate agents and building interests have been experiencing problems in getting enough land to carry on their wonderful business of flat size reduction, inflating cost of housing (and other type of accommodation) to astronomical proportions (both in white and black). Land was certainly available in huge enough chunks and, what is more, concentrated in only a few hands. Only it was frozen because of the MULC Act. A way had to be found out to get this and, if possible, other lands for the benefit of this segment of the business class.

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Representatives of the business class discussed this problem with the fund raising circles of the ruling apparatus of the Maharashtra Government sometime in 1980 when the state was under President's rule. The use of the ruse of offering

a solution to problem of slums and dilapidated houses to get the concessions for the private building industry was then agreed upon. These discussions culminated in the setting up of a Committee under the Chairmanship of K.K. Moghe, which submitted its report shortly thereafter. An elected state government came into existence some time later which, picking up the threads, handled the issue through yet another Committee headed by Premchand Awale. These committees suggested grant of additional FSI to the private building sector as an incentive for them to rehouse occupants of slums and dilapidated houses on lands so affected. A very sharp public reaction brought this operation to a temporary halt.<sup>20</sup>

Maharashtra Chief Minister A.R. Antulay had, in the meanwhile, got launched on his campaign of helping the cause of the people of his district, constituency, tehsil, village and begun establishing his charitable trusts. The High Power Steering Group headed by Ajit Kerkar (former General Manager of the BEST, Chairman of CIDCO Ltd., but then a Director of Tata Industries after retirement) and consisting of I.M. Kadri (architect), Rashesh Mafatlal (industrialist) and also Dr. Shanti Patel was appointed about the same time.<sup>21</sup>

Kerkar Group's recommendations are remarkable for their arbitrariness, total disregard to the issues addressed, and pursuit of ruthless policy of de-stabilisation of the dwellers

in the slums and dilapidated buildings in a brash attempt to help the private estate developers.<sup>22</sup> While a detailed examination of the Kerkar Groups' recommendations is attempted elsewhere,<sup>23</sup> we refer here only to the key ones among them :

1. Appointed specifically to deal with the problem of slums and dilapidated houses in the island city (not even in the suburbs and extended suburbs), the Group disregarding its terms of references, recommended conversion of the entire BMR into a grandiose Bombay Metropolitan City (BMC). The BMC not only includes old and new Bombay but also Pen and Alibag in the south, Karjat and Kalwa in the east, and Bassein and Bhiwandi (across the Bassein creek) in the north. Even Bassein creek has been crossed.
2. The BMC will be an integrated region with uniform civic amenities, transport, communications under an apex body headed by the Chief Minister. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay has, so far, not succeeded in achieving this uniformity in Greater Bombay, with the island, suburbs and extended suburbs roughly approximating to the ritual status accorded to the Brahmins, backward castes and the scheduled caste in the Hindu hierarchy.
3. The Group has recommended Urban Renewal Areas (URAs) and Slum Renewal Areas (SRAs) where the entire emphasis, between the lines, is on the removal of their overwhelming majorities

to alien (and surely outer) areas on 'human considerations'  
with the vacated land, taken possession for development,  
passing on to the private developers. If these operations are linked with the counter-part High Power Action Group on Slum Clearance which got into action during the raging monsoon in July 1981, and which has got a conditional clearance for its work from the Supreme Court on October 22, 1981 the implications become pretty obvious. This city was built for the rich business class and others had to make room for them to keep it that way.

4. Such grandiose plan needs staggering investment and true enough the Kerkar Group's plan involves an outlay only of Rs.6390 crores excluding the cost of land and physical and social infrastructure which the Group wants at uniform standard throughout the BMC and yet has left unquantified. This investment has to be spread over a period of 12 years beginning 1981. Roughly Rs.2550 crores are supposed to be coughed up by the government (averaging Rs.212.5 crores per year) and the remaining Rs.3840 crores by the private sector. The terms on which the private sector is to make housing available to the dwellers of slums and dilapidated houses have not been indicated. The Government is expected to raise Rs.800 crores by releasing the vacant urban land frozen under the MULC Act on which the private building sharks would obviously mint any sum upwards of Rs.8000 crores.

The Kerkar Group Report was presented to the Maharashtra Government on 16th August 1981 and would have carried the day in normal circumstances. To give poetic justice to the hapless living in the slums and dilapidated houses in Bombay, Arun Shourie blew up the grizzly game of the Antulay Trusts, including the membership of Ajit Kerkar in four of them. Mr. Antulay is not fully out of woods, and, therefore, the estate building sharks are waiting with baited breath. In the meanwhile both Bombay and New Bombay are growing as they have been ordained to by the business class. As for the future, BMC is being looked forward to just as the Development Plan, which started this entire high stakes-no-holds barred battle is being revised substantially to be presented to the Maharashtra Government once again. The circle of events has taken the full turn and yet the logic of Bombay's growth remains what it has always been.

### Notes and References

1. Actually, the week-end-hide-away zone stretching upto Khandala, Lonavla, Panchgani and Mahabaleshwar too should be considered part of this structure.
2. There is extensive literature on this theme. However, see, in particular, C. Rajagopalan, The Greater Bombay, (Bombay, Popular, 1962) pp. V-VI; Nigel, Harris, Economic Development, Cities and Planning : The Case of Bombay, (Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1978), pp.9-10 ; Report on the Development Plan for Greater Bombay 1964, (Bombay, Government of Maharashtra, 1964), XXIII - XXXI, and Report of the High Power Group on Slums and Dilapidated Houses (Ajit Kerkar : Chairman), (Bombay, Government of Maharashtra, 1981), Chapter I.
3. In building most of these institutions, it enjoyed all the concessions given to non-profit charitable organisations by the state government. It is not exactly in public knowledge that exclusive organisations such as the Bombay Gymkhana, Wellington, and Chembur Golf Clubs got their land on a lease of 99 years on a nominal rent of Rupee one per year.
4. For an insightful and often chilling examination of these, see, for example, M.O. Mathai, Reminiscences of Nehru Era, (Delhi, Vikas, 1977), G.D. Birla, Kuchh Dekha Kuchh Suna, (New Delhi, 1966), Stanley Kochanek, Business and Politics in India, (Berkeley, University of California, 1977), H. Venkatsubbiah, Enterprise and Economic Change : 50 years of FICCI, (New Delhi, Allied, 1977), H.S. Verma, "Some Aspects of Industrial Entrepreneurship : A Juxtaposition of National and U.P. Profiles", in T.S. Papola, V.N. Misra, H.S. Verma, R.C. Sinha and A. Joshi, Studies on Development of Uttar Pradesh, (Lucknow, Giri Institute of Development Studies, 1979), and H.S. Verma, Industrial Families in India : An Examination of Nature of Their Entrepreneurship, (in press).
5. See, for example, Bombay, (Bombay, MARG Publications, 1967); Twin-City for Bombay : Development Prospects and Problems, Report of a Seminar, (Bombay, Maharashtra Economic Development Council, 1970); and Bombay's Development and Master Plan : A Twenty Year Perspective, (Bombay, Bombay Civic Trust, 1979).

6. Report on the Development Plan of Greater Bombay 1964, (Bombay, Government of Maharashtra, 1964), XIX-XX.
7. Ibid, XXII.
8. Ibid, XXII. Predictably, some of this verbiage was used by the Maharashtra Government in appointing the Gadgil Committee in 1965.
9. Ibid, 172.
10. The Plan could not be faulted on this point, however, since it made it very clear (Chapter XI, pp. 171-172) that a large portion of the expenditure, included under the Plan, was being incurred by the Corporation even in its normal development schedule. Even if the Plan was not there, some of these would have to be incurred in any event. Subsequent history bears this out.
11. Charles M. Correa, Pravina M. Mehta and Shirish B. Patel, "Planning for Bombay", in Bombay, (Bombay, MARG Publications, 1967), 28-56. Significantly enough, this was published with the financial assistance of the Tata Electric Companies and Tata-Ebasco Consulting Engineering Services. Tatas were also to loan the services of one of its Directors to CIDCO Ltd. for more than two years during the period 1972-73 and still later absorb quite a few middle-level ex-CIDCO executives in their various companies.
12. That it was not so has been accepted by the Bombay Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (BMRDA), and it is actually working on a number of such plans in the entire Bombay Metropolitan Region (BMR).
13. For a fairly useful discussion on this theme, see, for instance, Nigel Harris, op cit and H.D. Kopardekar, "Metropolitan Growth and Social Change in India", in Selected Papers in Urban and Regional Planning, (Bombay, Bombay Regional Chapter; Institute of Town Planners, 1977), 25-37.
14. Figures arrived after discussions with its officials.